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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt:  
No Time for Obituaries1 
Kacper Rękawek 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the oldest socio-political movement active in Egypt. Its 
members and structures are now undergoing one of the most severe crackdowns in its history, at the 
hands of an Egyptian government that constituted itself in the aftermath of a popular revolt followed 
by a coup against a short period of MB rule in 2013. The MB, however, although dispersed and 
fragmented, is still not defeated, and faces options related to its future political trajectory. This paper 
discusses these options and concludes that the MB is most likely to ready itself for a “long struggle” 
scenario that would amount to waiting out the period of repression and reconstituting itself on  
a bottom-up basis.  
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has existed in Egypt for 86 years, and has survived several crackdowns by 
the Egyptian security sector. In 1954, an MB member attempted to assassinate Gamal Abdel Naser. Then 
came the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981, followed by rising militancy among Egyptian 
Islamists in the mid-1990s, and after the 2005 parliamentary elections. Since the removal of President 
Mohammed Morsi on 3 July 2013, the movement, illegal but widely recognised and acknowledged thanks to 
its social and charitable activities, has been experiencing the most violent and prolonged period of state 
repression in its history. Between 3 July and 31 December 2013, at least 2,528 Egyptian civilians, many of 
whom were members or supporters of the MB, were killed by the security forces, and 18,977 were 
arrested (of whom 2,590 were classified as “political leaders” of the MB and other Islamist organisations).2 
Six months later the number of arrests could, according to some estimates, have risen to 40,000.3 
Nonetheless, the Egyptian state, which, through the then presidential candidate Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, 
announced that the MB would not exist,4 has been unable to eradicate the movement completely.5 The MB 
                                                          
 
1 The research for this article was conducted by the author in May–June 2014 in Cairo, Egypt within the framework of the SPrinT 
(Strategic Partnership in Transition) project, led by the Polish Institute of International Affairs and the Finnish Institute of 
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2 M. Dunne, S. Williamson, “Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability by the Numbers,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
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3 See: footnote 1.  
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2 
 
takes inspiration from its previous encounters with violent state repression and perseveres. Once again, it 
seems poised to defy the odds, and soldier on towards its centenary. The MB’s history of clandestine 
existence, its internal discipline, and the dedication of its cadres undoubtedly, play a role in the movement’s 
survival in an ever more repressive Egypt. Every Friday, its members, sympathisers and followers, albeit in 
diminished numbers, stage demonstrations all around the country, and the leaders of the movement 
continue, sometimes from exile or prison cells, to rally the MB’s rank and file. 
At the same time, however, the scale of repression and the MB’s relative unpopularity in Egyptian society, 
after its unsuccessful spell in governance between 2012 and 2013, have reduced its chance of attracting new 
members and reaching out to new political allies. This creates a new dynamic in which observers of the MB 
should not rush to compose the movement’s obituaries, but should instead concentrate on how the 
current bout of repression would, if at all, transform the movement, and how the MB plans to remain 
politically and socially relevant in Sisi’s Egypt. The six scenarios outlined below attempt to answer these 
questions and offer a glimpse into the possible future of the “movement of controversy and contradiction 
… near impossible to pin down,”6 which has a track record of surprising observers.  
Scenario 1: A Deal With…?  
The Egyptian polity is often presented as an arena in which up to four political players compete for power. 
These are the omnipresent and all powerful Egyptian military; the “old regime” (former members of 
President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party); the “liberals,” the “secularists” and the “left,” (an 
ill-defined and amorphous milieu of political parties, groups and activists who played a prominent role in the 
events of 2011 but proved politically unsuccessful in their aftermath or were marginalised by the military 
after the summer of 2013); and finally, the Islamists, a broad current encompassing not only the MB and its 
allies from the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy, but also the Salafis. Alliances between the 
aforementioned players, with the military as the ultimate “kingmaker,” are said to ensure the survival of a 
given regime in Egypt. At the moment, however, none of the aforementioned players are ready to accept 
the MB as a legitimate political force in Egypt, and nor is the MB prepared to reach a compromise with 
other players.   
The MB has a track record of contacts and tactical compromises with the “old regime,” especially when it 
comes to the movement’s self-limitation in relation to political participation (for example, in relation to the 
voluntary decision not to seek a majority in a given parliamentary election in exchange for the ability to lead 
a less clandestine existence).7 Moreover, many on the Egyptian left are convinced that the MB have proved 
willing to co-operate with the “old regime” in the process of jointly undermining its secular rivals in 
exchange for more lenient treatment of the Islamists (as was the case during the presidency of Anwar 
Sadat).8 Nonetheless, Mubarak’s former supporters are aghast at the thought of cooperating with the MB, 
and are banking on their ability to cooperate with the ascendant military. The latter is now the key political 
player in the country, having played a major role in ousting two of the last Egyptian presidents (Mubarak in 
2011, Morsi in 2012), governed Egypt between February 2011 and June 2012, been instrumental in installing 
the interim president after 3 July 2013 (Adli Mansur), and effectively nominated its head, the defence 
minister, al-Sisi, as the presidential candidate in 2014.  
If the MB is seeking a reliable political partner, the military would theoretically be the best bet. However, 
the army bases its current political ascendancy on the struggle with “terrorism,” allegedly epitomised by the 
Islamist MB. In this situation, it has no interest, at least for the moment, in striking any deal with the 
movement. Moreover, the latter rightly perceives the military as the main instigator and beneficiary of the 
2013 coup that removed Morsi from office. In such circumstances, one could be forgiven for not taking the 
possibility of such an alliance seriously, especially as some members and supporters of the MB are said to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 August 2014 saw another attempt at the movement’s eradication as its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, was banned. 
See: H. Kortam, “Top Egypt Court Dissolves FJP,” Daily News Egypt, 9 August 2014, www.dailynewsegypt.com.  
6 A. Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, Saqi Books, London, 2013, p. 8.  
7 See: N. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics, Cornell University Press, London, 2012. 
8 See: footnote 1. 
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have responded to alleged proposals for a military-MB deal with the statement “bring back our [MB] dead” 
first.9 That does not automatically mean that the MB is bent on destroying the army, as its members 
attempt to differentiate between the rank and file and the officer corps, alleging that the latter corrupted 
the armed forces. The movement has adopted the position of the need for the army to “return to 
barracks” and an end to “military rule,” and does not necessarily condone a revolt against the state itself or 
its institutions.10 
Theoretically, a more probable political partner would be the aforementioned “secularists” whose 
members are now, alongside the MB, also for the targets of repression by the Egyptian security sector.11 
The two sides, which cooperated during the January-February 2011 revolution, and both reject “military 
rule,” should be able to find enough common ground for cooperation. Surprisingly, the chances for such 
realignment are slim, as the “left” is not ready to forget the battles it fought with MB members over the 
fact that Morsi “betrayed” the revolution and granted himself almost absolute power via his presidential 
declaration in late 2012.12 At the same time, the MB feels wronged by the “left,” many members of which 
were instrumental in bringing down Morsi in a popular revolt, followed by a coup d’état in June–July 2013.13 
The final difficulty for the is the prospects of an MB alliance with another player is that, even if the MB were 
to cut a deal, no single individual or group would be in a position to conclude such negotiations. The 
imprisoned leadership is respected within the organisation but has only ostensible control over its 
dispersed structures, which are now functioning in a survivalist and independent mode. The leadership’s 
basis for internal legitimacy has been very much based on their experience, dedication to the Islamic 
proselytisation (dawa’a), social activities on behalf of the movement, and also the fact that most of them 
have served prolonged jail terms in Egyptian prisons. It was, however, the activities of those leaders who 
neglected dawa’a, and opted for full scale political involvement of the movement, that ended in the 
disastrous events of 2013. At the same time, members of a new generation of younger MB members are 
now imprisoned which in the longer term should allow them to question and perhaps challenge the 
authority of the pre-2013 leaders. There is also very little contact between the surviving MB structures, and 
very little coordination between them. For example, the rump leadership is said to communicate via text 
messages only.14 If there were to be a “deal” between the ascendant military and the MB, it would at best 
be an agreement with only one element of the movement, the “domesticated” faction that would be willing 
to function in Sisi’s Egypt and indirectly support the government’s legitimacy.  
Scenario 2: A “Domesticated” MB  
An MB functioning in Sisi’s Egypt would have to exist under a different name. In addition, it would probably 
be forced to restructure its activities away from any social or charity work, as the Egyptian state now sees 
these areas of activity as sources of MB strength and is keen to undermine them with its own charity work 
and stricter control of Egyptian mosques. Such an arrangement would be almost impossible to sell to any 
MB members who are convinced of the extra-political character of their movement, in particular the 
religious aspect. In these conditions, any grouping of MB leaders who would endorse such a political offer, if 
one were to be made by the Egyptian state at all, would almost automatically lose credibility with the rank 
and file members, aghast at the prospect of a compromise with a regime intent on eradicating the MB. 
Moreover, the history of the movement is not noted for encouraging examples of successful MB splits 
which produced seemingly more lenient and conciliatory Islamist groups or parties in Egypt. In reality, the 
internal wrangling in the MB amounted to nothing more than walkouts or desertions of groupings of usually 
Cairo-based, more reformist leaders who rejected the movement’s rigidity and communist party style of 
                                                          
 
9 Ibidem. 
10 K. Dawoud, “Brussels and Back,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 22–28 May 2014.  
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12 See: D. Kirkpatrick, “Citing Deadlock, Egypt’s Leader Seizes New Power and Plans Mubarak Retrial,” The New York Times,  
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13 See: footnote 1.  
14 Ibidem.  
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discipline.15 After leaving the MB, however, their political projects, such as the al-Wasat Party, failed to 
seriously alter the map of Islamism in Egypt.  
Theoretically, the movement’s youth wing, angry with the leadership’s running of the movement between 
2011 and 2013 (such as the alleged alliance with the SCAF, and alienation of other revolutionary forces), 
and coming to the fore as the previous generation of leaders is arrested, could be a partner in future 
discussions. However, this is also the part of the MB that is the most exposed to the government’s 
repression of the movement, for its student members have been sustaining the MB through their protests 
in recent months. Consequently, they have been shot at, killed or jailed, and are less than likely to separate 
from the original MB to form a rival Islamist outfit with the blessing of the current regime. Their increased 
anti-state radicalisation could prevent a quick return to politics for the MB, which will first and foremost 
attempt to reconstitute itself from the bottom up, while returning to what it used to do best, i.e. dawa’a. 
This could be followed by individual, leadership sanctioned though seemingly independent, forays into the 
political arena by some of the senior members of the MB.16 
Scenario 3: Rehab  
Just as chances for a “domesticated” MB to appear look slim, another scenario—the movement undergoing 
a “rehabilitation” process—also seems relatively unlikely. It is, however, important to discuss this prospect 
as the MB has been declared a terrorist organisation in Egypt, and in theory that entails the possibility of 
engaging the movement’s members in a state-sponsored process of not only disengaging from violence but 
also deradicalisation and separation from extremist ideals. Interestingly enough, the MB underwent a 
voluntary, and non-state sponsored, process of moderation and disengagement from violence from the late 
1960s onwards.17 Thirty years later, the Islamic Group (IG), an Islamist movement rivalling the MB (initially 
in a voluntary manner but later with the support of the Egyptian state), successfully de-radicalised on an 
organisational basis, which resulted in the release from prison of thousands of its members.18 
The key difference between those processes and the situation in 2014 is that the current day MB, despite 
being branded a terrorist organisation by Egypt, does not engage in violence on an organisational basis. It 
possesses, unlike the MB in the 1950s or the IG in the 1990s, no military wing, and thus it is impossible to 
demand its disengagement from violence. The movement’s members do engage in violent protests, and 
some of them are said to be radicalising and providing recruits for disparate terrorist cells, but the 
leadership of the MB and the vast majority of its members and sympathisers remain non-violent. The MB is 
also accused of links with the Islamist terrorists in the Sinai, or even a “post-ideological” alliance which sees 
both sides join forces to combat the hated military regime, but there is little evidence to substantiate that 
claim.19 Moreover, attempts to present terrorist groups such as Ansar Bait al-Maqdis as the post-2013 coup 
MB under a different name ring hollow, as these jihadists have a track record of operations dating back to 
2011.20 
If disengagement from violence is not a serious prospect vis-à-vis the MB, then one could consider 
attempting de-radicalisation of the movement. This, however, would prove tricky as the MB is often far less 
radical in its ideology and policies than elements of the Islamist milieu which are allowed to function in Sisi’s 
Egypt. These include the Salafi groups, to an extent politically represented by the Al-Nour Party, which 
came second in the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, and supported the removal of Morsi and MB from 
power in 2013. Moreover, asking MB members to recant their Islamism, a raison d’être for the movement’s 
existence, equates to demanding a retreat from proselytising, charity work, political and social activities, 
                                                          
 
15 See: C. Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, Princeton University Press, Oxford, 2013, 
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and the de facto end of the organisation. At most, some individual members might be tempted to 
rhetorically “de-radicalise” from expressing anti-Sisi sentiment in public, but that would have to be 
preceded by the establishment of some form of “domesticated” MB (see: Scenario 2). 
Scenario 4: Escalation 
In theory, a large social movement such as the MB could still attempt to escalate the political situation and 
seek a showdown with the Egyptian state. However, it is now obvious that the MB, which is far from 
eradicated, spent all its potential for political escalation via popular mobilisation in the summer of 2013. 
Moreover, at that time, even with fewer leaders, activists and supporters either dead or imprisoned, it 
proved unable to withstand popular anger against its rule, and in the long term failed to stop the creeping 
coronation of Sisi as Egypt’s president. Even though the new president’s popularity has recently been 
dented by painful subsidy reforms, this does not automatically mean a spike in the MB’s popularity.21 So far, 
it has failed to motivate its members and supporters to take part in nationwide protests against a series of 
events legitimising the post-coup d’état Egypt, such as the January 2014 constitutional referendum, the May 
2014 presidential election, and next month’s inauguration of Sisi. It even proved unable to destabilise the 
country on the anniversary of Morsi’s removal. In short, the movement is able to maintain the mobilisation 
of its most dedicated members, who continue to protest after midday prayers every Friday in different 
parts of Egypt, but is too weakened, fragmented and leaderless to coordinate nationwide protests.22 
All the above does not mean, however, that the MB will abandon the idea of escalation in the medium or 
long term. Currently, its protests are of symbolic value and the majority of Egyptians regard them as 
inconveniences or signs of desperation on behalf of an unpopular social movement. These protests, 
although draining police resources, are also to an extent welcomed by the Egyptian government, which 
bases its legitimacy partly on the grand struggle against “terrorism,” i.e., the MB. At the same time, the MB 
is said to be aware of the fact that it must persevere if its seemingly low-level protests are to contribute to 
the deterioration of the economic, political and social situation in Egypt. Its strategic reasoning dictates that, 
by contributing to “making things worse,” the tide will eventually turn in the MB’s favour.23 
Scenario 5: Terrorism  
If the short-term escalation of protests is less than likely, and the movement is adamant about its dedication 
to non-violence, then one should not expect the MB to opt for armed struggle. A structural embrace of 
this method of achieving political aims by the movement’s leadership would destroy the last 45 years of 
MB’s evolution towards an entity attempting to accomplish deep-rooted social change in Egypt, and striving 
for restoration of Egypt’s “legitimate” government (that of the deposed Morsi). The movement has no 
armed wing, and is not, as some have claimed, in the process of establishing one in neighbouring Libya.24 
However, radicalisation of individual members or elements of MB local or regional structures should not be 
ruled, out as they might be eager to hit back at the “military regime.” Moreover, one should not discount 
the influence that the successes of the jihadists of the Islamic State (IS) in nearby Syria and Iraq could have 
on the Egyptian militants and/or Islamists who could be tempted to establish a link with the aforementioned 
IS via Sinai, Jordan, and possibly the Gaza Strip.25 However, such a development is far from certain as the 
Egyptian security sector makes it harder for the local jihadists to operate transnationally because it is now 
actively involved in isolating the troubled Sinai from the rest of Egypt, and cooperates closely with Israel in 
its handling Hamas, based in the Gaza Strip. In addition to this, any attempt by MB members to establish, 
for example, an Egyptian arm of the IS, would only strengthen the anti-terrorist narrative of the Egyptian 
                                                          
 
21 B. El-Dabh, “Unsustainable Solutions to Unsustainability,” Daily News Egypt, 8 July 2014, www.dailynewsegypt.com. 
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23 See: footnote 1.  
24 See: D. Cristiani, K. Rękawek, “Algeria and Egypt Struggle with the Implications of Libya’s Political Chaos,” Terrorism Monitor,  
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government.26 This, to an extent, will act as a brake on any militant intentions of the majority of the MB 
members, who are far more likely to draw inspiration from their movement’s history and its ability to 
withstand numerous periods of repression.  
Scenario 6: Readying for the “Long Struggle” 
If a battered and dispersed, yet persevering, MB is unlikely to conclude a deal with the Egyptian state, re-
organise on more lenient and seemingly benign, “domesticated” lines for public consumption, engage in the 
process of de-radicalisation, escalate its protests or “go terrorist,” then the most plausible option is for the 
movement to dig in and await better times. This would entail going back to the MB’s roots, and existing in 
parallel with the Egyptian state. The MB could be counting on the fact that, the further Egypt moves away 
from the events of 2012 and 2013, the more likely it is to regain its socio-political standing amongst the 
Egyptians who are likely to grow disenchanted with a government imposing painful austerity measures, and 
targeting not only Islamists but also “secularists” in its drive to combat enemies of the state.27 
Consequently, the authorities will not be able to totally prevent the movement from bottom-up re-
organisation and reconstitution, as they will not possesses the resources to completely shut down an entity 
numbering hundreds of thousands of members who are used to operating in a semi-clandestine fashion on 
an everyday basis. 
The questions, however, remain, as to how this reconstitution would proceed, and, with the majority of 
leaders in prison or exile, who would be directing or coordinating. Another variable that must be taken 
into account is the stance of the movement’s radicalised members, who might contest the primacy of the 
old leadership, and could thus constitute a new “middle generation” (the first arrived in the 1970s and 
consisted of student leaders who refashioned the MB for political and parliamentary participation in the 
next decade).28 The difference might be that the new “middle generation” could, unlike their 1970s 
predecessors, end up pushing the movement back towards its dawa’a oriented roots, and away from 
engagement with non-Islamist political forces, so that joint opposition to the “military regime” becomes 
even less tenable. Thus it is likely that the MB could become more radical, and more insular in its approach 
to socio-political issues in Egypt. This is most likely to assure the movement’s survival, and annul its 
premature obituaries, but will simultaneously alienate it from its potential allies, and convince its members 
of the righteousness of their ways and means. In the end, the MB might revert to the well-known path of 
attempting to mould Egypt so that it fits inside the movement, and not vice versa.  
Conclusions  
Trying to ascertain the future of the MB, a poorly studied and widely misunderstood movement, is unlikely 
to produce a “smoking gun or ‘aha’ moment,” as anyone studying it will be far from certain if they have 
established its true nature.29 The MB is now even more diffuse than it used to be, with communication and 
command and control channels under severe pressure, and rank and file members under less supervision.30 
Moreover, this only reflects the pre-2013 reality of what in effect were several MBs in different parts of 
Egypt, with Cairo structures witnessing the highest level of internal political debate and dissent, and rural 
sections more dawa’a oriented and in line with the preferences of the movement’s conservative leaders.  
To compound matters further, the MB, which has a far from successful track record of cooperation and 
outreach beyond its own organisation, is becoming increasingly insular in its proceedings, and, as it feels 
wronged by the “old regime,” the military and the “secularists,” it is not likely to review its position 
significantly, or repent for its 2012–2013 mistakes in governance. Thus, it will not conclude any deals or go 
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through government sanctioned rehabilitation, and its internal discipline prevents it from splintering along 
factional or regional lines. At the same time, it is in no position to escalate the political crisis in Egypt, nor is 
it ready to go “terrorist.” 
In such conditions, the most likely scenario for its future is the aforementioned “long struggle,” during 
which the scattered remnants of the movement will attempt a “back to basics” retreat, and the MB 
operatives will endure another spell in the seeming doldrums of Egypt’s socio-political arena. They will 
persevere, but the “new” MB, just as the one of the 1970s and the 1980s, is likely to be different from that 
of 2014.  
 
 
 
